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ABSTRACT

In this project, I examine the philosophical theories of truth, gender, and power,
and the parallels between each theory. I argue that both Friedrich Nietzsche and William
James advanced theories that deconstructed the idea that human beings, or “man” and
“woman,” were bound by an essential nature or innate characteristics that determined
their social role. Though this critique was robust, I argue that it enforces gender
disempowerment on a number of platforms since the theories did not analyze gender, but
rather truth and value. Simone de Beauvoir, I argue, expanded Nietzsche’s and James’
thought, but included a critical analysis of gender and disempowerment. De Beauvoir’s
idea that gender identities are imposed and created by power defines gender as a socialconstruct, and something that individuals, though only privileged “man,” have autonomy
over. Though this analysis is extensive and emancipatory, I argue that de Beauvoir, by
defining “woman” as something that it, e.g. the “other” gender related to “man,” de
Beauvoir establishes as unified category of gender which entails exclusion of individuals
who do not fall under these rigid categories. I argue that Judith Butler’s conception of
gender as an imposed mechanism by power to define, classify, and separate individuals is
the most exhaustive and inclusive conception of gender among the authors that I
examine, and actively subverts the oppressive practices of sociopolitical power.

Keywords: Anti-essentialism, gender binary, philosophy of gender, feminist theory.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Philosophers William James and Friedrich Nietzsche, writing respectively within
the late-19th, and James into the early-20th, century developed extensive philosophical
analyses devoted to critiquing essentialist and metaphysical theories that had influenced
Western thought within the discipline of philosophy since Plato. James’ approach
grounded truth through a subjective means of practice, thus defining truth and value in
terms of its practical import and its ability to make sense of the external world.1 James’
understanding of truth on a large, social scale was a repeated practice of some types of
subjective maxims. Truth is related to its practical, real-world usage, and this practical
usage determines its value within a society. Mathematical concepts, James argued, are
not platonic entities that exist beyond human experience within some metaphysical realm,
but rather subjective concepts that were created and practiced for their practical usage
within the physical world, e.g. their ability to help human beings make sense of the world
within scientific discourse. The repeated practice of these fictional concepts ground them
as socially-constructed truths. Truth and empirical objects, anything existing in the
physical world, have no essential properties or natures. Rather, truth is created by
subjects.

1

William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” Pragmatism, in William James: Writings 1902-1910, ed.
Bruce Kuklick and the Library of America (New York, New York: Penguin Publishing, 1987): 508-509.
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Nietzsche expressed a similar anti-essentialist understanding of truth and
metaphysical concepts, claiming that truth is an individualistic construction. Through
Nietzsche’s thought experiment of “the Death of God,” metaphysics and objective truth
lose all bearing upon the physical world—in fact, the physical or experiential world is the
only world that exists.2 Metaphysical realities are fictitious concepts conjured in order to
give individuals meaning and power over their existence, and to allow truth, in an
objectively binding sense, to have significance and import. The gods Nietzsche criticizes
are represented in both rationalistic thought that emerged from the Enlightenment, that
established truth within a large metaphysical system of reality, as well as Christian
doctrine, thin addition to the god of Judeo-Christian traditions who established truth
within doctrine and laws. Nietzsche understands both Christian and rationalistic
systematization as the manipulation of truth into a metaphysical or supernatural
“beyond,” which enables individual beings to find meaning and structure under the threat
of chaos and meaninglessness.
This understanding of truth, Nietzsche claims, forces the individual being away
from themselves and places emphasis on a reality that does not exist. Reality, as
Nietzsche describes it, is purely empirical sensibility; anything beyond sensible objects is
nonexistent.3 Thus, metaphysical reality is nonexistent, and truth and value are purely
subjectively-created concepts. Nietzsche denies the existence of truth in-itself, existing
as an objective entity that determines the nature of the physical world, and describes truth
as an individual creation, based upon their own desires and drives. Truth, individuals,

2

Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Madman,” The Gay Science, Trans. Walter Kauffmann (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 1974): 181-182.
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and physical reality are not essential in nature. Rather, truth is synthetic. Truth is created
by individuals based upon their desires, instead of truth determining reality and
individual desires. Nietzsche philosophy was highly influential in 19th century social
theory and psychology, often influencing social and political movements that he was
situated amongst within his historical context. These particular sociopolitical movements
criticized notions of sexuality and gender relations as being understood as essentially
different, but still operated within essentialism. Feminist movements simply claimed that
there was no essential difference between masculinity and femininity, rather than
transcending essentialism altogether.
It is clear to see that both James and Nietzsche are both describing a version of
truth and reality that is anti-metaphysical and anti-essentialist. Rather than truth existing
within the objective realm of metaphysics, it is created and practiced by individuals in
order to determine their own version of reality and nature. Reality, objects, and existence
have no essential properties that exist beyond their practice or interpretation and
determine their existence within the world. This understanding of truth shows a
paradigm shift from essentialist notions of reality to anti-essentialism within
philosophical analysis.
One may think that gender essentialism, the view that gender, masculine and
feminine, is produced by essentialized sexual difference, now has no place within antiessentialist thought. Anti-essentialism refutes the idea of anything existing as essential,
therefore essential natures of sex and gender, determined by metaphysical concepts,
cannot exist under this paradigm of thought. One would assume that this conception of
truth and reality would undermine all forms of essentialism, including gender

3

essentialism; however, as I will argue in the forthcoming chapter, they do not. Both
Nietzsche and James tend to enforce binaried understandings of gender within social
structures. Gender essentialism and its resultant disempowerment can become an
individualist or social practice, where gender binaries and gender oppression can be
argued to improve social relations to efficiently function. James’ conception of truth
makes no effort to analyze gender or its relation within the paradigm of truth and social
practice. Though it deflates the idea that sex and gender are essentially determined, and
arguments that rest upon the idea that the gender binary is essentially derived are now
challenged and deconstructed, it still allows for a paradigm of gender disempowerment.
No argument can be given to satisfy this flaw, which operates under James’
understanding. James also justifies a notion of a sex and gender binary, thus entailing
oppression and exclusion of any individual who operates outside of this binary.
Nietzsche’s thought succumbs to the same fault. As I will demonstrate,
Nietzsche’s conception of truth and value does criticize and disprove arguments for
gender oppression and binaried social relations based on essential characteristics.4
However, disempowerment and binaried social relations can be enforced by being
supported as subjective creations based on willful desire and drives. Social relations can
easily adopt a binaried structure of gender and justify this relation through action upon
subjective desire and maxims. Also, Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist philosophy does
nothing to dismantle a binary of sex or gender, or challenge the notion that sex or gender
may have more than two rigid and unmixable categories. Thus, Nietzsche’s thought also
entails oppression and exclusion, and is not a critique of binaried social understandings.
Neither James nor Nietzsche analyzed gender disempowerment under their conception of
4
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truth and value. Anti-essentialism, though providing useful arguments to undermine
gender essentialism and disempowerment based on essentially different sexual natures,
does not critically analyze gender and gendered social relations. It is not until, I will
argue, the mid-to-late-20th century that gender is critically analyzed under a philosophical
paradigm.
Philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, I will argue, synthesized anti-essentialist
thought into a working critique of gender disempowerment and binaried social relations.
De Beauvoir reworked and reanalyzed the shortcomings of anti-essentialist thought, but
used anti-essentialism and notions of subjectively or socially-imposed truth within her
own framework, which sought to critically engage gender disempowerment and the
various social and intellectual theories that were analyzing gender. De Beauvoir held the
belief that gender and sexuality were distinct entities, and neither of which were
essentially determined to behave and operate in any certain way. This belief is justified
through anti-essentialist arguments, reinforced through James and Nietzsche. However,
de Beauvoir critically analyzes gender and claims that notions and relations of gender are
contingent upon the values and truths of a socio-historical situation. Simply put, social
norms and understandings regarding gender are adopted and applied to society as
objective facts about the nature of gender and reality.
De Beauvoir understands these norms as being synthetically imposed by
structures of power and privilege, rather than being objectively true and essential. Norms
are created and reinforced through social relations and institutions, and these norms are
merely synthetically created by systems of power in order to maintain their power.
Though de Beauvoir goes much further in criticizing gender disempowerment and its
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relation to essentialism, she operates within the framework of anti-essentialism, primarily
the framework of James and Nietzsche. Anti-essentialist understandings of truth and
reality are utilized by de Beauvoir, but synthesized in order to create a critical
understanding of gender and power within the discipline of academic philosophy. I will
argue in the following work that James’ and Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist thought was
influential yet harmful to a philosophical understanding and of gender and a critique of
gender disempowerment, and was later modified to serve as a critical analysis of gender
and unjust social relations by de Beauvoir.
Though de Beauvoir establishes a philosophical critique of essentialism and
gender disempowerment, she still operates under a gender binary, and in attempting to
define “woman” and the context of “woman” as unified, de Beauvoir consequently
defines “woman’s” situation as essential. For de Beauvoir, “woman” is defined as
“Other,” in relation to” man,” no matter the socio-historical context that defines either
gender identity. Thus, de Beauvoir’s critique consequently establishes a unified
definition of “woman” and operates under the understanding of a two-gender-two-sex
model, which enforces a gender binary and essentializes “woman” through an idea of a
unified definition. De Beauvoir’s critique of gender disempowerment within the context
of anti-essentialism in compelling and liberating, since disempowerment based on an
essential nature has no grounding; however, that understanding fails also to be
exhaustive, since it operates within a gender binary and unifies “woman” and the
oppression of “woman” under an essential definition.
Judith Butler, writing respectively within third-wave feminist movement of the
1990s, recognizes the problematic consequences of de Beauvoir’s theory. As Butler
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understands the history of feminist theory, feminism has consistently attempted to unify
“woman” in order to create a subject for sociopolitical recognition and emancipation.
Though this methodology is tempting, it is problematic. First, as Butler claims, by
assuming a unified definition of “woman,” feminism operates under the same
exclusionary and oppressive model that subordinates “woman” in the first place.5 A
unified definition of “woman” fails to account for other facets of one’s identity, such as
race, class, and sexual orientation. It also assumes that there is a unified and essentially
binding criterion of identity that all of “woman” shares, which fails to account for
cultural or social differences in subjects.6
Butler also claims that the idea of sociopolitical emancipation, which is the goal
of feminist theory, is itself a paradox. In order to gain sociopolitical emancipation,
“woman” has to appeal to a political power structure which has the ability to recognize
and equalize subjects. When feminist theory appeals to this structure, however, it appeals
to the structure of power that is responsible for its subjugation in the first place.7 The
paradox of feminist theory is that it seeks emancipation through oppressive means and
appeals to the source of its subjugation for emancipation. Feminist theory is in need of a
new critique of gender, power, and sexed categories that transcend the normal restrictions
of a binary and essential identity. Butler offers a new method critique for feminist
theory. In the work that follows, I will maintain the idea that anti-essentialist thought
fails to critique gender disempowerment outside of an essentialist understanding, while
de Beauvoir fails to transcend a gender binary and offer a fully anti-essentialist
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conception of gender identity, and that de Beauvoir entails a form of gender
disempowerment because of this. I will conclude that Butler’s conception of gender and
identity is the most exhaustive theory to critique subversive power, essentialist notions,
and gender disempowerment within the paradigm of philosophical analyses of gender or
truth presented by Nietzsche, James, or Beauvoir. I will also conclude that Butler offers a
challenge to rigid and exclusionary tropes of masculinity and femininity.

8

CHAPTER 2

NIETZSCHE, JAMES, AND SUBJECTIVITY

Friedrich Nietzsche and William James were both situated within a particular
tradition of Western philosophical thought. Metaphysics, since Plato, had formulated
truth to be objectively binding, existing beyond all human experience and interpretation.
Plato, through his idea of metaphysical Forms, defined truth and reality in this way.
Nietzsche and James were both responding to this interpretation of truth, and critically
engaging its validity. In the section that follows, I will examine Plato’s theory of the
Forms, particularly his idea of the “divided line,” and the essential and metaphysical
effects that stem from this theory. Then, I will examine, in some detail, Nietzsche’s
response to this interpretation, and his anti-essentialist understanding of truth and value.
I will briefly highlight various social and intellectual movements that use Nietzsche
arguments—that also influence Nietzsche’s work—to give context to Nietzsche’s antiessentialist thought, and detail a concrete example of its practice. I will then examine
James’ pragmatic understanding of truth, as a second anti-essentialist response to Plato.
Last, I will highlight the success and failures of these anti-essentialist approaches to truth
and essentialism, and their correlation to gender and binaried social relations.
To best grasp Nietzsche’s and James’ anti-essentialist thought, it will be most
helpful to examine Plato’s account of metaphysics and the essentialist understanding of
objective reality that it entails. This will also shed important light on how Nietzsche’s
9

and James’ ideology helped shape and structure de Beauvoir’s account of gender
a social-construct. Plato claims, in his work The Republic, that reality is divided into two
realms: the physical-or-sensory realm, and the metaphysical-or-intelligible realm.8 For
Plato, any object belonging in the sensory realm is a mere copy of its corresponding Form
in the metaphysical realm. So, for example, when some entity in the sensory realm is
deemed as beautiful, this entity is appealing to the Form of beauty, and thus has the
specific characteristics of beauty that the Form entails. Form-object relation is essential
and objective and the metaphysical Forms give structure to the physical objects. Plato
uses another example to demonstrate the physical-metaphysical nature of reality. Plato
uses the thought experiment of an individual comparing two sticks, both located in the
sensory realm, that are equal in size. Plato claims that the sticks are appealing to the
Form of equality, which is located in the metaphysical realm. For the sticks to be equal,
and for an individual to know what the function of equality is, there must be an
established, perfect Form of equality that an individual recognizes when making this
comparison; or that entities mimic when they are sensibly equal. The Form of equality is
the essence of physical equality, and thus defines its ontological standing in the sensible
realm.9 The Forms give things their essences, and all things have an essence. Forms
structure nature, and Forms are objective and perfect. So, for Plato, every entity in the
sensory realm has a specific and essential purpose and set of traits that is located in the
metaphysical realm. Metaphysical Forms are real and true, for Plato, and appearances are
merely appealing to their essential Forms. Platonic metaphysics, then, gives
essentialism—of any kind—its grounding. Essential natures must exist since the Forms
8

Plato, “Book VI,” The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith, ed. G.R.F.F Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006): 509d-511e, 216-220.
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are the essential part of any physical object, and no object can exist without its
corresponding Form. Forms and their objectively true status are privileged over sensory
objects and their contingently relational status, since the Forms are the nature of anything
that exists within the sensory world.
Essentialism is clearly entailed from this objective understanding of Form-object
relations. Forms are true, and thus structure all things that appeal to them, namely
everything within the sensory realm of existence. The Forms are the true structure of
reality. Gender is essentialized through this understanding, since it human beings, or
males and females, have essential natures. Maleness corresponds to its established Form,
as does femaleness. It is not a far-reaching step to justifiably claim that males are
privileged over females because of their essential natures. The masculine nature obtains
its certain properties from its Form, as does the feminine nature. It can be justifiably
argued that males and females are not only different, but that one is better than the other
because of innate concepts stemming from its nature or essence. Social and intellectual
disempowerment is entailed since social norms can arbitrarily pick-and-chose which
“natural” properties are to be privileged over the other, and that these properties are
essentially true and necessary. The only way out of this argumentation is to challenge the
paradigm of truth and essentialism itself, which Nietzsche and James both did. Now that
Platonic essentialism has been discussed, it will be simple to see the intent and arguments
that anti-essentialism challenges.
Nietzsche rejects the idea that there is a world that is beyond the sensible, human
world—he denies all existence of objective, intrinsic value and worth. For Nietzsche, the
world has no objective truth or purpose. God’s death marks the historical and intellectual
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moment that reality, truth, and value ceased to have essential characteristics and
justifications. Platonism claimed that there existed a world in-itself where all objective,
essential entities existed; Nietzscheanism, on the other hand, asserts that there is no
existing world that is in-itself, rather all truth and purpose is grounded within the sensible
world or human being. All value and truth, then, is contingent upon individual or social
creation and justification. Reality is not fixed within an objective, essential framework.
Reality, as Nietzsche defines it, is an interpretation of the experiential world, rather than
something that is-in-itself.10 Reality is perception and conjecture on the account of
individual or social creativity.
With this assertion, Nietzschean thought is anti-essentialist. Nietzsche’s
expression that “God has died” has more implications than just the void of objectivity in
reality; this claim has another facet. Since objective justification and purpose has ceased
to exist within individual conscience, individual human beings are responsible for the
creation of value, meaning, and purpose.11 The Death of God, then, has two implications:
the dismissal of objectivity and the existential responsibility for individuals to create
themselves and their own “truths” based on individual desire. Individuals are allotted
radical freedom over their lives and values once binding objectivity has ceased to become
a method for defining truth and existence. This freedom leaves the future open for
individuals to create themselves according to their own desired purposes. Nietzsche
claims that, in the aftermath of God or objectivity, individuals “shall become the masters
over [themselves], masters also over [their] virtues…” and are, thus, responsible for

10
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themselves and their desires.12 An individual’s purpose and character is discovered within
that individual, rather than outside them. Nietzsche thus disposes of essential entities and
metaphysical, objective truths. Through the thought-experiment of the Death of God,
Nietzsche has rejected Platonic metaphysics and essentialism as a whole, and has defined
truth and value as a social or individualistic creation; meaning, value, purpose, and reality
are assigned, not essentially derived at from objective entities. Nietzsche’s antiessentialism marked a new paradigm shift in academic philosophy, and a move towards
an existentialist account of philosophy and intellectualism.
Nietzsche’s “Death of God” is only one example of his anti-essentialist
philosophy. Nietzsche establishes an idea of an Intellectual Conscience in a number of
his works—especially his novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra. For Nietzsche, this
“conscience” is the only way individuals can create their own meaning and value in the
wake of the death of God. What Nietzsche is describing through this idea is the drive and
desires within an individual—their Will to Power—that forces them to introspectively
examine and reexamine their value and choices, in accordance to their own preferences.13
Nietzsche claimed that nihilism, or the state of apathy and despair in the face of the
meaningless of existence, was simply a failure in individual desire.14 An individual, for
Nietzsche, is made up of various forces of drives and desires (i.e. their Will to Power)
which stems from their Intellectual Conscience.15 Nietzsche is claiming that, since there
is no objective purpose in the world, individual beings must create their purpose from
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their own desires and preferences, which is found through a constant “checking-in” with
oneself and one’s desires—or their Intellectual Conscience. One’s Intellectual
Conscience is defined, then, as the constant examination and revaluation of their desires
and values. Nietzsche has rejected all definition of values and truths from an objective
understanding to a social and individual construction based upon desire and preference.
Platonic and Enlightenment thought are rejected, the current approach by social
intellectualism has been defined as fallacious, and individual creativity has been posited
as a means to truth and value. Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism was groundbreaking in
academic philosophy, for it shifted significance from an objective, essential
understanding of truth and value, to a socio-individualistic understanding. However,
within the discussion of gender and gender-essentialism, Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist
philosophy is problematic and caused problems for 19th and 20th century feminist
theory.16
In order to best understand Nietzsche and the contributions that he made to
philosophy and to the later analysis of gender, it is imperative to understand Nietzsche’s
historical context—in particular, to draw parallels from the ongoing debates of gender,
sexuality, and intellectual discourse to Nietzsche’s work. Nietzsche anti-essentialism
was influencing and being influenced by specific movements of late-19th century
Germany, and these movements are a concrete example of Nietzsche’s influence on
notions of gender. Nietzsche was writing at the latter part of the 19th century, after the

16
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Enlightenment had undermined the power of Christianity to be the most compelling
answer and justification to a variety of philosophical and intellectual quandaries. The
world was now structured by a metaphysical, rationalist system of thought, and truth was
independent of the physical world. Germany, in this post-Enlightenment world, was
operating under this scientific understanding of phenomenological examinations.
Sexuality, at the turn of the 19th century, was also under strict scientific analysis—
specifically the sexual sphere of individual behavior and the innate drives that this
sexuality implied. A wealth of intellectual rhetoric concerning sexuality appeared in
Germany at the beginning of the 19th century, which then had a tremendously significant
effect on social and political discourse. Sexuality determined one’s existence in society,
since, according to the social sciences that were prominent in this period, sexuality was
correlated with an individual behavior. Gender, sexuality, and social “place” were
viewed under one specific paradigm: the biological analysis.17 Through medical studies,
sexuality and sexually-driven social roles were established by, and for, working systems
of power.
Sexuality, social order, and identity were combined into a theory of biological
essentialism. e.g. that males and females had essential sexual, and thus character, traits
that were tied to their biological makeup, that shaped the political, social, and intellectual
sphere of Germany from the early 19th century until the 20th century. According to
contemporary historiographical studies on sexuality in modern Germany, sexuality and
its correlation to individual social existence was defined by “a set of concepts,
institutions, and practices developed by the bourgeoisie” and thus enforced by these
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social relations of power.18 Notions of sexuality and sexual practices were constructed by
various social structures and then normalized through biological studies and the social
and political acceptance of these constructs. Sexuality and society were related
interdependently, since sexuality had been conjured to determine the order of society, and
one’s status in society was thus determined by one’s “innate” sexual drives and
corresponding character traits—one’s sexual drives, under the interpretation of 19th
century German intellectuals, was directly related to one’s cognitive and social
capacities.19 Social intellectualism viewed the male sex drive as strong and forceful, thus
entailing their assertiveness and independence within their given social relations. Female
sex drives, on the other hand, were deemed as weak and submissive, thus entailing a
social existence of celibacy and interdependence.20 Sex drives were a determining factor
of how one would behave, and what one’s situation in society ought to be, under the
current understanding of 19th century sexology. Sexuality was a facet of individual
identity, since it determined one’s character qualities which was said to be solely related
to one’s biological makeup. This led power-systems to define individuals and their place
in the social order based upon their innate sexual drives, and based upon the definition of
sexuality that biology conjured for specific groups of individuals. Since sexuality was
“elaborated by medical experts—doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, [and] sexologists,”
as Edward Dickinson and Robert Wetzell claim, social power systems had justification
and credible “proof” that sexuality produced innate character traits, and biological
essentialism could then manage society in a specific manner.21 Thus, as a number of
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scholars claim, power-structures adopted and enforced notions of sexuality and social
identity and determined how individuals were situated within this construction.
Though gender was not specifically analyzed, per se, under this biological
construction of identity and social structure that defined one through their innate
biological sexuality, constructions of gender certainly derived from it. Notions of power
constructed sexual drives and concepts of biology to be essential to an individual’s
character, thus essential to an individual’s social place. Gender and sexuality, in the late19th century, were combined into a unified definition of identity. Sexuality and its innate,
biological concepts defined masculinity and femininity, and their corresponding place in
society. Politics, economics, and social relations were determined by one’s constructed
gender role. Femininity became known to be passive, submissive, and “pure,” in tandem
with “woman’s” innately weak and passive sexual drive. If a “woman” escaped her rigid
social or sexual classification, then she was seen as degenerate by social German society
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. An individual’s place was defined for them,
and this place was contingent upon relations of biology, power, and sexual drives. The
previously established gendered binary of social order, where masculinity is privileged
over femininity, was being reinforced by new scientific discourse and manipulated by
systems of sociopolitical power.
Various feminist movements in early 20th century Germany began to challenge
this notion of gender classification and oppression, and “woman’s” place inside of this
oppressively constructed system. Biological, innate sexual drives were the focus of
feminist scrutiny in late 19th century German intellectualism. Feminist and social theorist
Henriette Furth directly challenged the “unscientific” consensus of “woman’s” sexual
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character, and challenged “woman’s” corresponding place in society. Furth produced a
study, with the help of various 19th century biologists, that compared the sexual drives of
male and female plants and animals, and concluded that there was no essential difference
between them; she then related this finding to human sexuality, and exclaimed that there
was no difference in male and female drives and sexual capacities, and, thus, no
difference in male and female characteristics. The place of “woman” in German
society—the place of submissive, maternal passiveness— Furth concluded, was unjust.22
Prior to Furth’s study, it was constructed that “woman” was tied to her sexual drive,
which was established as lax or weak—as compared to the relentlessly strong masculine
drive. Furth reversed this ideology, and advocated that the sexual drive in females was
no different than that of males, and that “woman” ought to act upon this sexual drive in
hopes of gaining sexual and political equality, since the politics of social society were
strongly tied to one’s social-sexual perception. This feminist movement marked a shift in
intellectual discourse on sexuality and social structure in Germany at the turn of the 20th
century.
In the 1870s, social-psychology produced a number of studies on the sexuality of
“woman,” that determined, just as men, women had strong, innate desires, drives, traits,
and women were capable of being autonomous beings in relation to these desires—but,
were still inferior to men’s drives and traits. The ideology that “woman” ought to be
celibate ceased prominence with this new scientific “discovery,” and more social space
opened for women to morally and socially act upon their sexual desires.23 Though this
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study and newly established ideology helped “woman” politically and socially, it still
maintained a fixed notion of essentialism—”woman” and “man” had essential, innate
characteristics that were tied to their gender. Though Furth claimed that there was no
difference between the sexual and character qualities of masculinity and femininity, she
maintained that there were still essential defining traits of individuals—these traits just
were not different between men and women. Nonetheless, there were still defining,
essential traits within men and women, these traits were now just viewed as the same.
Prior to Furth’s and the social-psychologists analysis, sexuality was essential to an
individual innate character, and this version privileged men; Furth’s and socialpsychology’s analysis claimed that men and women were essentially the same, using
biology to back their claims. Though Furth’s analysis, along with the new analysis of
scientific sexology of the 1870s, binaried essentialism—the idea that male sex drive, and
thus males in general, is privileged over female sex drive—essentialism still existed in
academic thought. Furth failed to deny, as did the social scientists of her context, that
any essential characteristics existed within individuals and their characters.
Though Nietzsche details an extensive account of anti-essentialism, and
establishes a thorough philosophical analysis regarding truth, meaning, and individual
value and freedom, Nietzsche does not give a working analysis of gender or gender
disempowerment. Gender is not analyzed under Nietzsche’s anti-essentialist philosophy,
and this philosophy is not utilized to scrutinize gender disempowerment or a gender
binary. Under Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism, gender disempowerment can actually be
enforced. Since all truth and value is based upon individual desire and preference, gender
disempowerment—or a privileging of masculinity over femininity, as social history has
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shown is a popular paradigm of social structure—can be argued and justified as an
expression of an individual or social preference. A truth of gendered-disempowerment
can be related to the desires and wants of a given individual or group of individuals, and
this desire can be carried out and acted upon with no condemnation or flaw within this
individualistic understanding of truth and creation. Since very little-to-no critical
analysis of gender is given in Nietzsche’s work, and Nietzsche’s philosophy claims that
the future of an individual’s existence is open for self-creation and preference, a gender
binary and gender-disempowerment can be easily rationalized and established under
Nietzschean anti-essentialist thought. Though Nietzsche’s thought established a working
counter-example to essentialism and objectivity, it did not provide gender a place in
academic philosophy or with a method to condemn disempowerment based upon one’s
facet of identity. Later philosophers recognized this problem of Nietzschean antiessentialism, and established a new method of gender examination under anti-essentialist
and existential frameworks.
Philosopher William James was actively centered, as was Nietzsche, within a
critical analysis of Platonic metaphysics, which shifted the paradigm of truth from an
objective, metaphysical understanding to yet another subjective understanding. James’
pragmatism sought to alter the conception of truth from a world beyond the physical
sensory world, to the sensory world itself. James was writing and criticizing two
dogmatic forms of truth that plagued philosophy during this context, rationalism and
empiricism. James is primarily concerned with refuting the metaphysical structure of
rationalism, however, he claims that under both interpretations nature is understood as
being essentially determined by something, be it metaphysical forms that individuals can
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understand, or some other type of objective structure that is unknowable. Truth is
understood in objective concepts that are discoverable by individuals, but not determined
by them. Nature is essentially structured in a particular way, and human beings “absorb”
this truthful structure.24 According to James, understanding truth to be metaphysically
determined is simply to “escape” the concreteness of reality. Physical sensibility is
reality, for James, and attempts to escape it lose all ability to engage with the physical
reality. Abstraction and metaphysical concepts are not an “an explanation of our
universe, it is….a way of escape.”25 Essential and metaphysical conceptions of truth and
nature are not, in fact, that determinate force shaping reality and sensory objects; rather,
concepts of metaphysics and essential natures are nonexistent, and are only means of
escaping the plurality and chaos of the physical world. James furthers this critique by
claiming that “the actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes systems,
and systems must be closed…for [individuals] in the practical life, perfection is
something far off…” which strengthens his understanding of reality as the perception of
sensory objects.26 Metaphysical essentialism has no meaningful relations with concrete
reality, as James defines it, and is thus an escape and an attempt to systematize this
pluralistic reality.
Truth, for James, is not determined by an existing metaphysical form; nor is
reality determined by an essential nature that is perfect and absolute. This is a direct
contention with Platonism, and is thus an anti-essentialist conception of reality and truth.
For James, truth is determined by its “practical consequences,” and not some essence
existing beyond human experience. Human experience is a requirement for pragmatic
24

James, Pragmatism, 493.
James, Pragmatism, 495-496.
26
James, Pragmatism, 498.
25

21

truth, in the sense that a belief’s practical consequences and usage determines its meaning
and status as a truth.27 James furthers this thought by claiming that a belief becomes a
meaningful truth by determining “what conduct it is fitted to produce,” meaning that a
belief’s significance is only related solely to its import and result.28 If the result is
favored and continually practiced, then that belief becomes a synthetic truth. Truth does
not derive its nature from an essential, metaphysical beyond; rather, truth is subjectively
created and practiced, and its significance is contingent upon the practical impact that
would resolve from adopting the belief as a truth. Metaphysical disputes, according to
James, are meaningless—there are no practical consequences and imports that can be
derived by holding a particular metaphysical concept, thus the concepts have no practical
meaning. Abstractions and things in-themselves, or essential essences, are “unlawful
magic” which have no practical or distinguishable significance.29 Platonic essentialism is
deconstructed, and a new, practical paradigm of truth is conceptualized under subjective
and practical terms. Essential properties are meaningless, and concepts and objects
derived their significance from their practical meaning and prolonged practice.
James further defines his conception of truth and reality, and claims that truth is
an instrument. James claims that mathematical and scientific “truths” are not grounded in
metaphysical objectivity, but are simply the best human-constructions that allow
individuals to engage and make-sense of the physical world. Truth is instrumentally true,
as are mathematical and scientific truths, in the fact that it allows individuals to “get into
satisfactory relation” with the physical world, or serve as “conceptual short-cuts” that
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enable individuals to engage their reality.30 Truth, again, is a synthetic practice that only
becomes significant in its relation to its practice and the outcomes of that practice.
Objective nature, as James argues, “is nowhere to be found” and is nonexistent under this
anti-essentialist paradigm.31 Reality consists of sensory experience, and individual
conception of these sensory experiences. There exists no binding, objective essence that
determines how things are. Things are sense and understood in a plurality of way, and
individuals adopt specific beliefs based on these experiences. The beliefs gain
significance when their practical consequences are significant enough to allow
individuals to make sense of the physical world in a cohesive and efficient manner. Truth
and beliefs changes as new experiences emerge, thus altering the practical consequences
of these existing truths and beliefs. The structure of reality is simply human
interpretation and practice, which is in constant flux as new interpretation and practice
emerge. Truth is contingent upon its practical and useful relation to experience and the
ability to engage with the physical world in a consistent manner; thus it is a synthetic and
individual practice. Social meaning and values are contingent upon wide-scale practice of
given beliefs that have particularly helpful practical effects. Reality and meaning are
“made true,” rather than being structurally determined that way.32
This conception of practiced truth certainly dismantles the idea of metaphysical
essentialism. Essential properties are meaningless and have no practical, concrete import,
and are only an escape from reality. Since truth is framed a useful practice and
interpretation of experiences, there cannot be said to exist any type of essential nature
that binds reality or individuals. Gender essentialism, as in the case of Nietzsche’s anti30
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essentialist thought, is dismissed on grounds of abstraction and meaninglessness.
Essential, objective entities do not exist. However, this conception of truth also fails to
analyze gender and binaried social relations, and therefore enforces gender
disempowerment. It can easily be conceived that gender disempowerment can be a
practiced truth with consequences that are justifiably argued to efficiently arrange social
reactions and individual understandings of sensory reality. Pragmatic conceptions of
truth establish a working critique of essential natures and realities, thus any argument
grounding disempowerment or a binary within a framework essential nature cannot hold
to be true. Masculinity and femininity have no natures that differentiate them or serve to
privilege one over the other, but social reactions can discriminate against masculinity or
femininity based on adopted and continued social practices; one gender can be provided
over the other, not based on nature, but upon synthetic practice. Pragmatism makes
advances in analyzing gender, since is deconstructs essentialism, though it fails in the fact
that it justifies disempowerment and binaries based on subjectively imposed and
practiced truths.
Nietzsche and James both made significant strides in an analysis of gender, by
attacking essentialism on two different methods; however, both failed to critically engage
gender disempowerment, and developed theories that enforced different forms of
disempowerments based on gender and binaried social relations. Neither challenges the
notion of sex and gender binaries, either. Both conceptions of anti-essentialist
philosophy assume that there are two sexes and two genders. Thus, those who fall outside
of the normative functions of masculinity and femininity, or male and female, are
automatically oppressed for failure to conform to established binary of sex and gender.
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Thus, oppression outside of essentialism is justified and oppression based on binaried sex
and gender is entailed. Later theorists will recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the
anti-essentialist conception of truth and meaning, and will work to synthesize its failings
in extensively analyzing gender and disempowerment, but also use its core arguments as
the foundation to their theories.
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CHAPTER 3

DE BEAUVOIR AND THE HISTORICAL SITUATION

Working nearly half a century later, French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir
utilized the framework of Nietzsche’s and James’ anti-essentialism as well as 19th and
early-20th century social theory. De Beauvoir’s groundbreaking work, The Second Sex,
published in 1949, sought to formulate a new analysis on gender and power, taking the
shortcomings of the social feminists, intellectuals, and philosophers of 19th and mid-20th
century and creating a new synthesis to analyze gender and “woman’s” “Otherness” in
modern French society. Feminist theory, prior to de Beauvoir, was still immersed within
the Nietzschean inspired scientific and psychological discourse of the 19th and 20th
century social theory, coming out of Germany. Nominalism was the prominent feminist
theory of 20th century France, which concluded, as did German social theory, that “man”
and “woman” were essentially the same. The socio-political situation of “woman” was
bettered by such theories, but no more progress was made from the feminist movement of
early-20th century Germany, which primarily equalized the sexual drives of “man” and
“woman”, and gave “woman” more opportunity and choice to act upon those sex drives.
De Beauvoir claimed that this understanding of sexuality and gender—two terms that
prior feminism would have treated synonymously—was flawed, and did nothing to
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critically analyze gender or the gendered structure of social politics and individual
choice and freedom.33
De Beauvoir’s analysis focused on the socio-historical situation of femininity,
rather than assigning “woman” specific characteristics and arguing for the political and
social equality of those individuals, as prior feminists had done. De Beauvoir shifted the
paradigm of gender analysis in a new direction, one that analyzed notions of power and
identity from a phenomenological and social-constructivist standpoint. This new theory
of gender focused more on deconstructing the phenomenon of gender and gender roles
within a certain historical situation, while separating gender and sex as two distinct
phenomena, as opposed to examining sex and gender within the framework of sociopolitical advancement. De Beauvoir’s theory was a robust paradigm shift to a
philosophical analysis of gender within a specific individual and social situation, and this
challenged all preconceived notions of gender, power, essentialism, and conceptions of
identity. Feminist theory now had an entirely new and distinct paradigm, which was
based upon the work that prior anti-essentialists and feminist had established.
De Beauvoir wrote in a particular context that enabled her to make various claims
and arguments on gender, individual situations, and sexuality. France—coming out of
the Second World War, and being immersed in the intellectual rhetoric of existentialism,
pluralism, liberalism, anti-essentialism, as well as other radical theories—was
conveniently situated for groundbreaking analytical work on the social-sciences,
individualism, human psychology, and responsibility.34 These new intellectual
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movements in French society, and the state of France after the moral and physical
destruction of Second World War, allowed for new debates and angles on a variety of
topics, and established a foundation for various thinkers to establish new ideas and
analyses in a variety of fields. A critical and philosophical analysis of gendered society
emerged.
De Beauvoir’s socio-historical context, just as her work focuses on, served as a
helpful context and source of inspiration for her work and radical ideas. In this section, I
seek to contextualize de Beauvoir in a given historical and intellectual situation. First, I
will examine de Beauvoir’s feminist theory in light of mid-20th century French social,
intellectual, and political society, in order to give context to de Beauvoir’s thought, and to
display the progression of feminist and social theory that emerged in Europe from
Nietzschean anti-essentialism. Second, I will analyze de Beauvoir through a transmission
of intellectual ideas such as Platonism, anti-essentialism, and existentialism to detail de
Beauvoir’s theory, and how this theory was a synthesis of these branches of thought.
Last, I will conclude that de Beauvoir’s analysis on individual situations was a new and
unique angle on prior feminist and philosophical theory, thus sparking a new wave of
gender analysis and field of academic philosophy; a critical analysis of conceptions of
gender and gender disempowerment.
I complicate recent scholarship that explores de Beauvoir’s work within its
intellectual community, regarding Freudian psychoanalysis or American radical
feminism, and I situate de Beauvoir more deeply within French postwar intellectualism.35
The situation of France after the Second World War is essential to contextualizing de
35
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Beauvoir through a philosophical and historical understanding. Historian Judith Coffin
undertook this task in her work “Historicizing the Second Sex;” my work enriches this
insightful and extensive analysis, by relating de Beauvoir’s ideas within a larger
transmission of ideas regarding gender and academic philosophy.
De Beauvoir, in her introduction to The Second Sex, expresses her impatience
with the existing feminist and social theories of modern France. According to de
Beauvoir, “enough ink has flooded over the quarrel about feminism...and the volumes of
idiocies churned out over this past century do not seem to have clarified the problem.”36
Nominalism, which asserted that men and women were, in most senses, the same, was the
most prominent feminist theory of mid-century France. Social-science had moved from
the 19th century understanding of essential differences within “man” and “woman,” to a
more liberal theory of gendered existence: that there were no properties that differentiated
the two, and that each were essentially the same. “Man” and “woman” were both labeled
“human being.” De Beauvoir criticizes this view, claiming that it was too trivial and
abstract: “Nominalism is a doctrine that falls a bit short...clearly, no ‘woman’ can claim
without bad faith to be situated beyond her sex.”37 The theory was trivial because,
according to de Beauvoir, every individual is a human being; the theory added nothing to
the analysis of gender disempowerment.38
Nominalism is too abstract to have any political or intellectual import for de
Beauvoir, because though both men and women may be human beings, there are specific
social distinctions and inequalities that separate them, e.g. the binaried society that
privileges men over women. De Beauvoir’s claim is that feminist theory fails to
36
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examine gender in the correct way. For de Beauvoir, an individual’s gender identity is a
facet of their existence, and that this facet is inescapable. To identify both “man” and
“woman” as a human being and nothing more would be to separate an individual from
their sex and gender identity. In order to properly analyze gender, then, one must
examine what grounds gender identity, and, for de Beauvoir, this is an individual’s sociohistorical situation.39 With this new analysis, de Beauvoir articulated a new direction
within feminist theory, and moved gender into the scope of academic philosophy,
surpassing existing feminist theories and their platforms of analysis.
De Beauvoir did not stop at critiquing French feminist theory of the mid-20th
century. Rather, de Beauvoir’s work criticized, analyzed, and synthesized a variety of
aspects of French intellectual culture. In the aftermath of the Second World War,
intellectual and public discourse published a number of works on ethics, humanism,
liberalism, Marxism, and a variety of others. However, the French intellectual and public
spheres were not particularly interested in analyzing “woman’s” liberation movements, or
gender as a whole. Feminism, as de Beauvoir’s intellectual colleagues would have
claimed, had already been given a sufficient analysis; the issue of feminism was over.40
After the Second World War, the French public sphere was focused on establishing a
unifying morality and enforcing normative ethical codes. Literature, philosophy, socialpsychology, and other academic disciples were expected to produce work that matched
up with this established moral code.41 This meant that French society had repressed—or,
at least, confined—sexuality, and the discussion of it, to the private sphere.

39

de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 4-11.
Coffin, “Historicizing the Second Sex,” 124.
41
Coffin, “Historicizing the Second Sex,” 131.
40

30

Unlike Germany in the 19th century, amid anxiety and social reformation after the
Second World War, talk of sexuality was eliminated within intellectual and social
discourse, and lost significance in the social and political order, as well as its prominence
in intellectual studies. According to Coffin, “simply to speak of the ‘sexual’--and to
insist that it was important or necessary to do so—was to reduce and debase the human; it
represented the surrender of civilization of the individual to the dark forces of
sexuality…”42 French culture was attempting to recover from the atrocities of the Second
World War by alienating immoral discussion in public and academic settings, which
included any discussion of sexuality and gender. Feminist theories in mid-century
France, primarily, focused on pacifism and political advancement; de Beauvoir’s analysis
shifted this paradigm and created feminist theory anew.
In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir asserts that “one is not born, but rather becomes,
‘woman’. No biological, psychic, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human
female takes on in society; it is civilization as a whole that elaborates this...” which serves
as the underlying claim to her intellectual analysis of gender: tropes of gender are socially
defined for by structures of power and privilege, and adopted and personified by specific
individuals.43 De Beauvoir’s analysis, then, claims that an individual's socio-historical
situation defines their identity and existence. Gender, for de Beauvoir, is an entity that is
placed on a sexed body. Gender is a socially-created trope, and conceptions of gender
are particularly binaried; the masculine nature is far more socially privileged than the
feminine nature, and this phenomenon is contingent upon sociopolitical understandings
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of gender and value, relative to a particular context.44 “Woman” in mid-century France,
according to de Beauvoir, is posited as the “Other;” something systematically different
than the dominant, privileged masculine gender. For de Beauvoir, French society
privileges masculinity as “right by virtue of being a man.”45 She also claims that
“humanity is male, and man defines “woman”, not in herself, but in relation to himself.
She is not considered an autonomous being.”46 Conceptions of gender and identity are
defined in relation to the values and ideologies of a particular society; those with social
privilege and power, however, possess the ability to create and enforce conception of
gender. Thus, “woman’s” situation is created by power and privilege, relative to a
particular social context.
Gender, for de Beauvoir, is not a Platonic ideal that is. Rather, gender is a socialconstruction, based upon the ideologies and privileges of a given socio-historical
situation.47 In mid-century French society, as de Beauvoir claims, “woman” is the
“Other,” the inferior, or the submissive. Men “have better jobs, higher wages, and
greater chances to succeed than their female competitors; they occupy many more places
in industry, in politics, and so forth…”48 French society is dominated by male privilege,
and this privilege creates the social-situation of “woman”. Throughout historical
discourse, “woman’s” subordination has been normalized by a society dominated by male
privilege. “Lawmakers, priests, philosophers, writers, and scholars,” de Beauvoir claims,
“have gone to great lengths to prove that women’s subordinate condition was willed in
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heaven and profitable on Earth.”49 De Beauvoir’s claim reiterates her idea that gender is
created and assigned through social and political discourse. Gender is a social
phenomenon, and individual identity is contingent upon a set of circumstances pertaining
to their situation. Identity, choice, and freedom are limited. Only those that are
privileged are able to seek any sort of transcendent freedom from their gendered
situation, while, also, creating and enforcing situations for those less privileged.
Social and political relations are separated into two categories, and two classes of
individuals are defined through the current sociopolitical context of France. According to
de Beauvoir, “the division of humanity into two categories of individuals…is a static
myth.”50 Through this division of classes, one set of individuals, “man,” is defined
through reality and has power over ones conception of identity. The other class,
“woman,” is defined through a “transcendent ideal,” or a fixed stereotype, where no
control over identity is possible because it is defined as an absolute entity that escapes
beyond all physical interpretation.51 Thus, “woman” is fixed, defined, and limited while
“man” is free to create and define; the Eternal Feminine is formed from this social
division, which defines “woman” as a trope based on a specific set of pejorative
characteristics. De Beauvoir complicates this division and trope by claiming that “it is
obviously not reality that dictates to society or individuals their choices between the two
opposing principles of unification; in ever period, in every case, society and individuals
decide according to their needs.”52 Here, de Beauvoir is claiming that the idea of
“woman” is merely a series of characteristics and definitions that binds identity, and that
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this trope is created by a given society or set of individuals in order to enforce power and
advance interest. Social relations solidify this trope through a widely accepted practice,
which individuals and institutions accept, enforce, and center operations on. This
conjured ideal is widely adopted and practiced by a particular context, through relations
of power and privilege who create and enforce it, and is also personified and adopted by
individuals whom are defined by the trope itself.53 Or, the idea of “woman” is “effected
by patriarchal society for the end of self-justification…this society imposed its laws and
customs on individuals in an imagistic and sensible way.”54 This trope, then, is falsely
justified through an absolute, metaphysical concept that does not exists, and is thus
falsely imposed by structures of power and privilege which define concrete reality and
social norms.
According to de Beauvoir, “when [an individual] is offered no goal, or is
prevented from reaching any goal, or denied victory of it, [their] transcendence, falls
uselessly into the past…this is the lot assigned to women in patriarchy.”55 The trope of
“woman” takes away any type of freedom “woman” has to create and define itself, and
thus traps “woman” within the definition that is defined for it. Rather than allowing
“woman” to create itself through choices and values, “woman” is forced to comply with a
rigid stereotype that is justified by a platonic nature, which is defined by power systems
of privilege based on the self-interest of a given socio-historical context.
De Beauvoir is concerned with dismantling Platonism and essentialist tropes of
identity and truth, just as Nietzsche and James were; thus, de Beauvoir is operating under
an anti-essentialist paradigm of thought. However, de Beauvoir’s new paradigm
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incorporates anti-essentialist arguments to analyze conceptions of gender and power.
Since gender, for de Beauvoir, is a synthetic identity that is created by a given society and
placed onto individuals, de Beauvoir is using an anti-essentialist idea in a way that
includes gender. Since, under this paradigm, truth has no objective grounding, but is
created and practiced by individual beings, gender is analyzed in the same method.
Gender has no essential traits; rather, it is constructed by and contingent upon a given
socio-historical situation. Gender and sexuality, then, have no specific or essential
essence and definition, thus both phenomena are constructed. This new synthesis takes
claims from Nietzschean and Jamesean anti-essentialism, and analyzes gender while
scrutinizing power systems and privilege for creating the imminent situation of particular
individuals. Gender as an essential definition of one’s existence is dissected to become a
social construct the time, relative to an individual’s situation.
De Beauvoir’s examination of gender also took place within, and extended, the
newly established intellectual movement of existentialism. For de Beauvoir, one’s
gender identity is a part of their being; or, as existentialists would call it, their facticity.
Existentialists separate being into two categories: being as facticity—which is defined as
uncontrollable factors of one’s existence such as one’s sex, race, or family genealogy—
and being as transcendence—which is defined as the ability to shape one’s existence,
actively, in accordance to their own self-interest and value. These two entities are
intricately intertwined, and one must be both of them at the same time to escape being in
bad faith, or a faulty, deceptive existence.56 An individual, to the existentialist, is not pure
facticity nor pure transcendence. Nietzsche’s and James’ philosophy clearly established a
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groundwork for the existentialists since subjective value and truth are the foundation of
the theory, and the future for individuals, under anti-essentialist thought, is open to
create. French existentialists were concerned with examining individual responsibility,
value, and freedom—a focus fitting for postwar France—but neither were concerned with
the analysis of gender. As part of the existentialist movement, though, de Beauvoir
extended the debates of existentialism to include a consideration of gender within its
framework.
De Beauvoir’s work incorporates existentialism and anti-essentialism to evaluate
gender situations. De Beauvoir claims that, “every time transcendence lapses into
immanence, there is a degradation of existence into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into
facticity…” which grounds her thought in existentialist ideology.57 De Beauvoir adds to
the prior claim by stating “[but] what singularly defines the situation of “woman” is that
being, like all humans, an autonomous freedom, she discovers and chooses herself in a
world where men force her to assume herself as Other; an attempt is made to freeze her
as an object and doom her to immanence…”58 According to de Beauvoir’s claim, the
situation of “woman” in this given socio-historical situation, is not chosen by individuals,
it is assigned. Being of transcendence succumbs to being of facticity: choice is limited,
and even thwarted, by the situation. In this sense, de Beauvoir utilizes and restructures
the philosophies of anti-essentialism and existentialism to examine gender and individual
situations, and utilizes each theory to critically analyze gender and social structures of
power within a given historical context.
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Utilizing a philosophical paradigm, de Beauvoir synthesizes arguments and ideas
from feminist theory, anti-essentialism, and existentialism to develop a critical
philosophical analysis of gender and gender-disempowerment; something that feminist
theory, philosophy, and French intellectualism prior to de Beauvoir had failed to do. De
Beauvoir is, as many scholars claim, the shift into Second Wave feminism, challenging
various other theories to examine the social, economic, and historical situation of
individuals to determine their status in society. Rather than existing under a moralized
framework, or premise that there was no difference in “man” and “woman”—while,
simultaneously denying the blatant difference between the sexes in the social-sphere—
and situating individuals beyond their sex, de Beauvoir framed her analysis differently,
examining the correlation of gender identity, choice, and social power structures. Not
only did de Beauvoir falsify traditional and social theories of French intellectual and
feminist thought, breaking ground in a new method of feminist and social theory, she also
expanded the philosophical discipline to include the critical analysis of the relations of
gender and power.
De Beauvoir is situated within a paradigm of anti-essentialist thought that is
attempting to restructure the focus or truth and nature from platonic metaphysics to a
socially imposed understating. De Beauvoir’s conception of the trope of “woman” is
justified by appealing to a metaphysical form, just as platonic metaphysics is. This form
then defines social relations and concrete reality. However, de Beauvoir understands of
this trope as being a socially imposed reality, which is contingent upon values and
ideologies of a particular context, and thus presents an anti-essentialist argument.
“Woman,” nor “man,” is essentially anything other than the values defined by a given
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social power structure and the choice of the agent to define themselves according to
values. However, only allowing those whom are socially privileged are able to actively
define and create themselves and the privileged values of a social context, while limiting
those not privileged by the social system to an imposed and inescapable definition of
character. De Beauvoir’s conception of power as a subversive social operation further
defines anti-essentialism, and this usage analyzes and critiques notions of gender and
disempowerment and defines gender as a socially-imposed value that is widely practiced
and enforced.
Though de Beauvoir offers a critically engaging critique of the situation of
“woman,” her arguments fails to be exhaustive. De Beauvoir understands individuals
defined in relation to the privileged and practiced values of a given social context. Social
power allows individuals the autonomy to actively choose the values and identity tropes
for themselves, which thus defines the values of a given context. However, those not
recognized by social power are defied in relation to those who are, and are thus
prohibited autonomy and individuality, and are inescapably defined as “Other.”
Historically, “woman” has been defined in relation to “man” and thus as a social
otherness. Masculinity exists as a socially privileged and socially mobile identify trope,
where femininity is defined only in its difference to masculinity. Though individuals
have a sense of autonomy to choose to become feminine or masculine, social power
prohibits the feminine from this choice, and devalues the identify trope altogether. De
Beauvoir seems to be advocating for the autonomy of the feminine, and a feminist
critique of the social power that defines and privileges to become more egalitarian and
accessible.
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This, at first, seems emancipating. However, de Beauvoir fails to excuse her
analysis of all types of oppression. De Beauvoir, by only understanding sex as being
defined in terms of male or female and gender as being defied in terms of masculinity and
femininity, is operating within a gender binary, and excludes those who do not conform
to either sex or gender; it fails to allow any type of freedom or autonomy outside of the
traditional binaried understanding of sex and gender. De Beauvoir also defines “woman”
as essentially related to “man” or the privileged social values and identity trope of a
context, and thus offers a universalized understanding of “woman.” De Beauvoir defines
“woman” as unified which shares a common conception of being defined as “Other” in
relation to “man” and is offered no autonomy and individuality by the existing social
power system. This is problematic because it fails to exhaust the term of “woman,” and
creates a false universal trope that ignores differences in class, race, sexual orientation,
and so on and the different types of oppression that are associated with these differences
in identity, which are all included within the term “woman.” Thus, de Beauvoir’s analysis
fails to be exhaustive in understanding “woman”, and actually entails various forms of
oppression, essentialism, and binaried social relations.
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CHAPTER 4

BUTLER AND ANTI-FOUNDATIONALISM
“The Master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”59
Judith Butler recognized, in de Beauvoir’s and the prior anti-essentialists work,
the potential to entail various forms of oppression while advocating for equity. Butler
rejects the conception of gender and feminist ideology of “second wave” feminism,
particularly that of understanding “woman” as a universalized identify concept that all
who identify as “woman” share in, and operating under a binaried understanding of sex
and gender.60 In this section, I will examine Butler’s claims against feminist theory
particularly that of “second wave” and Beauvoir’s theory of gender theory, and how this
framework of feminist theory entails oppression in its effort to dismantle oppression.
Primarily, how prior feminist theory and de Beauvoir’s anti-essentialist theory of gender
defined “woman” in universal and binding terms for purposes of recognition and
emancipation. However, Butler claims this foundational approach, using “woman” as the
foundation of feminist politics, essentializes “woman” into a unified definition of value,
class, sexuality, and oppression. More specifically, this approach assumes that “woman”
is defined under a white, straight, middle-class definition, since this trope of “woman”
has been privileged in most socio-historical contexts. Feminism, therefore, excludes
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various individuals who cannot be defined under this privileged and limited
definition. In the following work, I first examine the paradox of emancipation that Butler
charges feminist theory with. Second, I examine the pejorative implications that Butler
details regarding universal identity, and how this conception entails oppression. Third, I
will examine Butler’s refutation of a gender binary and her understanding of the
relationship of gender, sex, and power production. Finally, I will conclude that Butler
offers an alternate critique of gender disempowerment and power, which highlights
elements of anti-essentialism through its anti-foundational approach. Since Butler rejects
foundational definitions of gender, I conclude, her work is anti-essentialist. Under this
approach, gender has no essential characteristics that define it. Since gender has no
essential characteristics or foundations and cannot be defined in one specific way with
specific traits, Butler’s project challenges traditional tropes of masculinity and femininity
that have unreachable criterion, while allowing gender theory to be more inclusive in its
approach.
Butler claims, in her work Gender Trouble, that “feminist theory has assumed that
there is some existing identity understood through the category of woman.”61 For
emancipatory purposes, a unified identity of “woman” seems necessary and essential.
One must present a common identity or group to be recognized within a political
structure. In order to make appeals for political advancement, a group or individual must
define some sort of identity that is publically recognizable. “Woman,” as Butler claims,
has historically not be recognized as autonomous or even recognized as an existing
identity at all, and thus feminist theory has formed a type of unity and definition in order
to create a subject of “woman,” a subject for feminism, and a subject for political
61
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recognition and advancement.62 De Beauvoir advanced this type of understanding, by
defining “woman” as something that universally is. Representation and unification
defines “woman” as essentially something, and creates a subject that can be sociopolitically recognized as deserving of various rights and mobility. However, Butler
rightly recognizes that this form of unification is flawed for a number of reasons. “If one
is a ‘woman,’” Butler claims, “that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be
exhaustive…”63
Gender and gendered categories of identity, such as “woman,” fail to account for
cross-cultural and historical contexts where gender is defined and practiced in different
way than others. Also, assuming there is one subject of “woman” assumes that there is
only one voice of “woman,” one common mode of oppression, and one common set of
values and lifestyle.64 Emancipation, if received from a sociopolitical power structure,
would only allow for emancipation from one specific gender classification. Though there
are a number of different desires that are not determined by binaried categories, cultural
and historical contexts, and value systems that gender categories can take on, e.g.
differences in race, class, sexual orientation, and the like, a universal “voice” of feminism
fails to account for these differences, and simply combines difference into a unified,
superficial definition of “womanhood” in order to benefit and emancipate a select few
members of the inflated subject. Feminism operates under a paradoxical system of
emancipation, since it attempts to liberate “woman’s” oppression by oppressing various
differences of “woman.”65 Feminism therefore becomes a power structure that
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subjugates and oppresses various individuals and lifestyles within socio-historical and
sociocultural contexts. Representation and systems of oppression for a woman of color
or a lesbian woman will be much different than representation and systems of oppression
for, say, a straight, middle-class white woman. In order to avoid acting as a regulatory
and oppressive system of power, the language and “objective” of feminism must cease
creating universalized claims for common representation.
With this understanding of power and representation, Butler’s project
problematizes the very idea of emancipation within feminist theory. According to Butler
and French poststructuralists like Michel Foucault, political and regulatory power
systems are, in fact, the reasons for forms of subjugation in the first place.66 According to
Butler, subjects under the control of a sociopolitical structure of power, which is defined
as legal, institutional, and linguistic operations, are “regulated by such structures, by
virtue of being subjected to them, [and] formed, defines, and reproduced in accordance
with the requirements of those structures.”67 Thus, political operations, legal operations,
and linguistic limitations, e.g. how discourse defines and communicates concepts and
identities, produce and define subjects and their situations according to the limits and
methods established by the structure of power itself. Feminist theory that appeals to this
structure will be self-defeating, Butler claims, because this structure is the reason for their
situation and subjugation. Production and representational politics conceals its structural
and production power by law and institutions which claim to represent individuals while
but simultaneously produce them and their situations.68 The ideology and methods that
support the political structure and regulate individual identities and situations are justified
66
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through “naturalized” laws which constitute individuals as subjects under the power of
that law. Thus, when feminist theory appeals to a political power structure, it is operating
under a self-defeating methodology; it uses the exact same oppressive and exclusionary
tools as the power structure that oppresses it. With universalizing and essentialist
foundations, feminism becomes an oppressive and coercive power structure that defines
“woman” only by a privileged monolith.
In short, when feminism defines “woman” through linguistic means as a unified
category, it is acting as a regulatory power structure that oppressively produces subjects
and situations; the category is itself oppressive, and thus the failure to understand
differences in the subjects that it is claiming to represent, feminism actually creates an
oppressive and faux situation for various members under the subject definition.
Foundational feminist politics, which attempts to focus on a foundation of “woman” and
the subject of “woman,” becomes the source of oppressive power that it is attempting to
deconstruct.69 An anti-foundationalist account of feminism, therefore, can achieve
critical emancipation from subjected oppression. De Beauvoir and prior feminist theory
failed to recognize this flaw.
Butler’s work exposes how essentialist notions of identity serve to subjugate
various individuals to the established system of oppressive power. However, in order to
be fully inclusive, this understanding must actively challenge the notion of the sex/gender
binary, lest it continue to oppress various “subjects” who fail to conform to the mode of
operation that the structure of power has established. Butler understands structures of
power to create and naturalize conceptions of sex and gender, and the legal and social
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means in which is upholds these rigid conceptions.70 However, Butler understands
structures of power as operations that create two rigid categories of sex based on the
created two categories of gender; thus, the sex/gender binary.71 Structures of power
intend to situate social relations upon a “heterosexual matrix” where specific modes of
behavior are regulated and prohibited, and situations are created through this regulation
and prohibition. Sociopolitical power, therefore, intends to situate society under the
paradigm of normative heterosexuality, where two specific genders are needed to form a
contrast.72 Gender categories are established and imposed by various structures of
political and social power. Two categories are established with corresponding behavioral
characteristics, with each gender category opposing the other. This strategic creation by
sociopolitical power yields rigid classification of individuals, and regulates behavior,
identity, and desire. Gender is a socially constructed classification that made to seem
normal and natural behaviors structures of power, in order to maintain the “heterosexual
matrix.” A gender binary is constructed in order to enforce and normalize desire, sex, and
social relations under a specific intent; that is, to regulate social heterosexuality and
structure social relations, sex, and gender within heteronormative standards. This
understanding deflates the rigid and binding nature of masculinity and femininity, making
each out to be created and enforced tropes. Gender becomes less structured or abstract,
and is understood within the context of normative and coercive power.
Gender, as Butler defines it, controls and regulates biological discourse of sex,
and conceptions of sex. If only two rigid genders exist, then two corresponding rigid
sexes exist. Butler claims that the “‘truth of sex’…is produced princely through the
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regulatory practices that generate coherent through the major coherent gender norms.
The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete
asymmetrical opposition…”73 Operating under the power of the heterosexual matrix as
defined and enforced though the regulative practices of a power structure, a gender binary
is formed to produce and regulate normative functions. Gender, then, defines sex, and
produces specific situations that advance a particular social end. Gender, sexual desire,
and sex categories are produced by various structures of power that regulate all social
relations. Thus, any individual who fails to adhere to these superficially created tropes of
identity and orientation fails to be accepted, or even recognized, by social relations.
Rigid forms of masculinity and femininity, with the corresponding behavior and character
traits that oppose one another which have been established by the sociopolitical power
source, are forced upon individual to conform to their corresponding identity. This
ordering of gender and sex defines discourse, language, and social operations. If a sexed
body fails to conform to define itself to its corresponding gender-related identity, that
body is unrecognizable and thus excluded within the structure of social relations.74
According to Butler, “identity is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex,
gender, and sexuality…the person is called into question by the cultural emergence of
those ‘incoherent…’ who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility
by which persons are formed.”75 In short, those who fail to conform to the regulative
understanding of sex, gender, or orientation will be unintelligible under the paradigm
established by the current sociopolitical structure. Tropes of masculinity and femininity,
then, have absolute power of individual identities through structured and rigid standards.
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Thus, the sex/gender binary is superficially created in order to produce a specific end,
which is the regulation of society under the heterosexual and heteronormative standards
as produced by systems of political and social power. These conceptions dominate social
ideology and discourse, and any paradigm outside of this specific order is deviant and
socially and/or linguistically incomprehensible. The gender binary is thus a regulatory
tool of a dominant power structure. Gender is used as a regulatory means of control in
which power structures situate sex and desire in order to define a particular paradigm of
social and individual operations. Gender controls notions of sex, discourse, and
intelligibility. Thus, the gender binary proves to be a false category established by
oppressive power sources, and essentialist understandings of “woman” not only oppress
“woman,” but enforce the binary and heteronormativity that the system of oppressive
power has established. In order for feminist theory to avoid utilizing oppressive
functions that are implied in the foundation of “woman,” it should abstain from
foundational and essentialist definitions of gender and instead deflate gender and
heterosexual norms as mere tactics of control imposed by oppressive politics. According
to Butler, “juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field
of power; hence there is no position outside this field;” therefore, for feminist theory to
avoid becoming an, or at the very least utilizing the means of, the contemporary field of
power, it’s goal should work towards an understanding “genealogy of its own
legitimating practice” in order to authentically critique and undermine the field of
power.76 This geology will yield subversive results within the framework established by
contemporary power. Gender and sexed categories can be deflated and defined as
superficial concepts used to regulate social relations to suit a heterosexual privileged
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ideal. Feminism can also avoid utilizing the same tactics that coercive power utilizes,
e.g. essentializing a unified but white and privileged voice of feminism and excluding
others who fail to meet this definition while giving power to the conception of gender it is
trying to dismantle, and subsequently becoming a linguistic and political power structure
that defines subjects through coercive means.
This conception of gender and sex escapes the oppressive paradoxical nature of
feminist politics prior to “third wave” feminism and queer theory. Butler’s conception of
gender and critique of identity avoids operating under essentialist notions of unity, which
includes differences in the identity of “woman” to account for race, class, sexuality, and
so on. Sex and gender are not limited by two rigid categories; these categories are
defined and concealed by structures of power in order to regulate individuals and
individual desires, and are defined as binaried to form sexual and gendered opposition.
Thus, Butler offers the most inclusive and critical conception of gender and identity
among the anti-essentialists and de Beauvoir, though the critique is limited to operate
within the inescapable oppressive and ubiquitous nature of power. Rigid definitions of
masculinity and femininity are challenged and deconstructed as means of situating and
classifying individuals towards the end of heteronormative sexual standards.
Heteronormative standards are therefore defined as the coercive and regulative means
implored by oppressive power, and gender categories and binaries are the means to
achieve these standards. Individuals are now able to have some, though limited,
autonomy and choice of gender or desire since standards of gender, sex, and desire are no
longer understood as totalizing and solidified.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
Plato’s essentialist understanding of truth, nature, and value dominated
philosophical discourse and justified gender disempowerment and social gender binaries.
Since, according to Plato, all physical objects, including the values or identities that
individuals hold, are defined by a metaphysical and overarching Form, all physical
objects are said to have essentially defining natures. Thus, any form of truth and value
will be defined by a definite Form that is supported by a metaphysical concept. Entities
within the physical realm are simply mere copies that derive meaning and essence from
the corresponding Form that defines. It is clear, then, that gender essentialism and a
gender binary is entailed and supported by this conception of reality and objective truth.
Essential natures, maleness and femaleness, are Forms that exist metaphysically, and are
thus discovered by individuals. The Form of maleness thus establishes a rigid form of
behavior, value, and character traits that are supported through the Form of male. Thus,
any individual possessing these qualities is defined as a male by the corresponding Form
of male. The same holds for femaleness. A given historical context can justify gender
disempowerment from this ideology by simply privileging the “truth” of masculinity over
femininity, or vice versa—though, historically, the former precedes the latter in almost
every case.
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Any such arguments that wish to argue against gender oppression or a binary that
privileges one or the other conceptions of gender and sex must operate under an antiessentialist argument. The conception of truth, meaning, and value being essentially part
of an object or individual must cease to have any grounding. Simply stating that, in terms
of a binaried social-structure, that “woman” ought to be, or actually is, more privileged
that “man” is still using essentialist notions to ground claims. Under this paradigm, the
privileging of one sex or gender over the other is meaningless, and can be argued for the
same justifications on either side. Both sexes and genders are grounded within
essentialized natures that derive truth and meaning from a metaphysical Form. Thus, in
order to escape such a conception of gender and sex, and to dismantle social binaries and
stereotyped oppression, essentialist arguments must be show to be false, or operating
under false assumptions and justifications. Only then will a feminist critique of
oppression, binaries, and power be able to be successfully and inclusively achieved.
Nietzsche and James, I argued, successfully altered the paradigm of truth and
value from essentialist to anti-essentialist framework. Nietzsche’s understanding of truth
is exemplified in his provocative thought experiment “the death of God,” where God
symbolizes objectively and universally established “truth” and objective value. Rather
than existing outside of human interpretation and control, truth and value are human
constructs, established by individuals or groups of individuals, in the case of social truths,
to assign meaning and significance to existence, based on individual desires and the
desire to achieve power and control over one’s life and life-choices. Nietzsche
understands individuals as possessing a strong and constant flux of desire, and having an
internal conscience that wants to act upon these desires. Since God and objectivity have
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ceased to ground truth, value, and choice, the individual and individual desires are the
only authentic meaning-and-value-makers. One is constantly driven by an internal “will
to power,” that forces individual to create meaning and adopt values, only to create more
meaning and adopt more values in order to satisfy their internal driving forces.
James’ conception of truth and value, as I have presented it, operates under the
same framework as Nietzsche’s. For James, as with Nietzsche, truth and value are not
essentially defied objective concepts that exist beyond individual interpretation and
creation. Rather, individuals or a collection of individuals form conceptions of truth
based upon practical consequences; or, simply, what is accomplished by establishing a
particular idea, or what would be the consequences of not adopting an idea. If, as an
individual or a social consensus, an idea or concept is adopted and continually practiced
because of its practical consequences, then that idea or concept is solidified as an adopted
or imposed truth based on continual and wide-spread practice and acceptance. Truth is
not given significance because of its corresponding Form, as with Plato, nor is it solely
based upon individual or collective desires and the means to achieve these desires, but
truth is adopted because of its import with individuals engaging and conceptualizing the
world. If a concept does not aid individuals in understanding the world, fails to be
continually practiced, or another idea would have better practical consequences if it were
practiced, then that concept is not practical and is thus not imposed as truth.
Mathematics, therefore, is not grounded in objective mathematical concepts that are
continually discovered by individuals, but are rather created and practiced by individuals
because the concepts practical import in engaging and understanding the world. The
same is true for value. Values are accepted and established for the practical consequence
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of accepting that said value, and the values continued practice. Meaning and truth are
imposed on society and individual life rather than defined by it.
Intuitively, this seems to be emancipatory and groundbreaking for feminist theory
within the context of critiquing oppression and disempowerment. The anti-essentialism
from James and Nietzsche is, in fact, successful in offering a critique of power that
oppresses conceptions of gender or creates oppression for specific gender conceptions
based on essentialist understandings. Justifications for oppression, binaries, and forms of
disempowerment based on natural or essential characteristics have no grounding. Since
truth, values, and individual characteristics are now based solely on individual or social
creation, nothing can be said to be essentially one way or another. No sex or gender can
be essentially defined, and no conception of sex or gender can be essential privileged
over the other. Gender characteristics and “truth” about gender is a social or individual
construction and practice, rather than something essential or objective. From the antiessentialist conception of truth, gender traits are contingent upon social constructions and
individual practice.
However, as I have shown, this paradigm is not as emancipatory as it may
intuitively seem. Though oppression from essentialism is successfully deflated as based
on false justifications, oppression and disempowerment can still be enforced. Antiessentialism though, as presented by Nietzsche and James, actually entails oppression and
a gender binary. Nothing about anti-essentialist ideology changes the conceptual
understanding of sex and gender, or that either category fails to be as rigid and exclusive
as it is defines. Any particular individual who identifies as or personifies the
characteristics of a mixture of masculinity or femininity is automatically excluded and
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oppressed under anti-essentialist frameworks, because gender and sex binaries are not
analyzed or challenged. Moreover, since anti-essentialism frames truth within individual
or social creativity and practice, it enforces arguments for oppression and
disempowerment. Gender-based oppression could be a practical and acceptable
consequence to engage social relations and politics, and thus wide-practiced and
accepted. James’ pragmatic approach to truth fails to exhaust its critique to include
gender or sexual oppression. Nietzsche’s framework fails in the same regard; oppression
and disempowerment can be desired and adopted as values by individuals or socialstructures, and enforced by Nietzsche’s thought. Though both are emancipatory in
engaging oppression based on essential natures, they fail in a number of other regards to
be feminist valuable for a feminist critique.
De Beauvoir understood the powerful significance of anti-essentialist thought, but
also recognized the potential danger of the framework left on its own with no expansion
or synthesis. Though de Beauvoir utilizes particular aspects of anti-essentialist thought,
she expands the framework to actively include a critique of subversive power relations
and gender oppression. De Beauvoir understands individuals as the French existentialists
do, claiming that individuals have no binding natures or characteristics other than
uncontrollable facets of identity such as race or ancestry. Thus, no essential gender
tropes exist that can truthfully define individuals, and all individuals possess the
autonomy to choose how they wish to identify. A sense of agency is involved where
individuals choose what values and identity categories that they conform to.
However, as de Beauvoir rightfully concludes, this sense of freedom and
transcendent choice that individuals possess is only socially accessible to those whom are
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privileged and have mobility awarded by a social power system. De Beauvoir is critical
of prior feminist theory, since it, as she claims, fails to analyze gender and the situation of
“woman” in correct terms, and simply advocates for equal political advancement. This
advancement will not be possible, though, because only masculinity is allowed to freely
choose and practice individual autonomy, where femininity is defined by the context, in
opposition to masculinity, and thus unable to choose or transcend the situation of
“Other.” Whatever “man” is defined as being, though its own values which shape the
value structure of a context, “woman” is defines as its opposite and “woman’s” autonomy
is elusive. Gender is defined in purely anti-essential terms, conceptualized and
understood relative to a particular context. De Beauvoir is advocating for political and
social power to equalize autonomy and conceptualize gender categories as less rigid.
Since agents can choose what values and identities they take on, masculine values or
feminine values are not so rigidly defined; “man” can take on feminine values and viceversa. This view obviously incorporates notions of anti-essentialism, but expands the
framework to include a critique of gender and an etymology of gender classifications.
De Beauvoir’s theory, though a breakthrough in feminist theory, still operates
within a gender binary and presents as unified definition of “woman”, and of gendered
categories. De Beauvoir’s theory, therefore, operates within the same essential and
coercive structure of power as oppressive politics does, and it unable to offer a robust
critique of this power and its conclusions. De Beauvoir, while attempting to define what
“woman” is in order to advocate for political and social autonomy, essentializes
“woman” by defining the terms as relative to “man.” A unified and essential
classification is presented in order to define and represent “woman” for a feminist
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critique. De Beauvoir also enforces a sex/gender binary by assuming that masculinity
and femininity or “man” and “woman” are the only two gender and sex categories. Thus,
autonomy to identity as mixed-gender or mixed-sex, or outside of the paradigm of
binaried sex and gender, is not distinguishable under de Beauvoir’s feminist theory. In an
attempt to liberate and include “woman” with the social and intellectual privileges that
“man” is awarded, de Beauvoir entails various forms of oppression by defining “woman”
as an essential and unified category of analysis, and limiting the sphere of sex and gender
to the widely-accepted gender/sex binary. In order for feminist theory to be fully
inclusive and avoid being paradoxical, the sex gender binary must be deconstructed and
essentialist notions of identity and unification must cease to be utilized for feminist
theory and identity politics. If not, feminism will continue to be a form of oppression and
thus struggle to operate outside of oppressive sociopolitical power and the binding
categories that this power entails.
Butler’s move into “third wave” feminist theory offers a workable framework for
feminism to challenge oppressive charges brought against it, and to challenge coercive
power and the sex/gender binary. Under this conception, “woman” is not a unified
category defined by some type of shared identity or essential characteristic. This
ideology fails to consider the difference in subjects of “woman,” and serves as a mode of
oppression for those who do not fit the white, middle-class, heterosexual idea of what
“woman” is as defined by sociocultural norms. A universal identity cannot account for
cross-cultural, historical, or sexual differences. A type of feminist theory that
universalizes “woman” as something that essentially “is” consequently serves to enforce
a regulative power structure that defines individuals and enforces the oppressive norms of
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the structure that it is attempting to criticize. Though the idea of creating a recognized
subject seems necessary for political emancipation, the practicality of that action enforces
the oppressive means that the subject is attempting to emancipate itself from.
Appealing to a political power structure for emancipation is, as an act,
paradoxical, since the political power structure is the force that creates and subjugates the
situation of “woman” in the first place. Political power serves as the regulatory force that
creates and produces situations, values, and ideologies that define a context or subject.
Through prohibitive and regulatory laws, but under the guise of being the natural and
logical sources of representation, political power creates the subject and subjects
‘situations. It also creates the binaried structure of sex/gender, in order to conform to the
heterosexual ordering of society. Notions of binaried gender are created, opposed, and
serve to create sex and dominates language and discourse within that given structure.
“Representational” power creates the structure of gender and desire, naturalizes it, and
thus controls subjects. Gender, therefore, is not binaried or natural; it is a trope
established by power in order to situate social relations in a manipulative and
heteronormative way. With this understanding, gender is not limited to the framework of
the female feminine and the male masculine, but based on individual desires existing
within, but subverting, the heterosexual matrix. Butler utilizes notions of antiessentialism and anti-binaried conceptions of gender to present a powerful and subversive
critique, while dismantling rigid notions of gender categories and the elusive criterion
that define them. Heteronormative standards are deconstructed and the notion of
normativity within gender, sexual, and social identities is challenged. Butler, as opposed
to James, Nietzsche, and de Beauvoir, offers a critique of power and normative standards
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without using oppressive and exclusionary methods, or the methods utilized by coercive
power itself.
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